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conjectured that there could be no sunspot equilibria if the fundamentals of the underlying economy admitted a unique equilibrium. Hens (2000) constructed an example to show that this conjecture was false. A weak form of Mas-Colell's conjecture is indeed false, but there is an error in Hens's proof. The first part of this comment shows the mistake in Hens's argument, and the second part proves the existence of the relevant sunspot equilibria. We conclude with a discussion of why an example like Hens's is necessary if one wishes to prove that a stricter form of Mas-Colell's conjecture is indeed false.
We follow Hens's notation almost exactly. There are two sunspot-contingent assets paying returns denominated in units of the numeraire. These returns are
where v sj is the return on asset j in state s. There are two households indexed by i ∈ 1 2 , and in each state of nature there are two goods. The fundamentals of the economy are endowments 1 = 1 0 and 2 = 0 1 and preferences described by the composite function h i u i R 
, and 2 = . Using Hens's four normalizations q 2 = 1 and p 2 s = 1, we see that the asset demands imply 
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Since expected utility is defined up to an affine transformation, we can always set
Write (1) as A = 0 0 1 ; we are looking for a solution satisfying 0. Note that
Since = A −1 0 0 1 0 only if all the elements in the last column of A −1 have the same sign.
Hens sets y
These assumptions imply that p 1 1 = 2 − q 1 /3 p 1 2 = b + 2 /3, and p 1 3 = c + 2 /3. Since b q 1 c ∈ −1 1 , p 1 1 ∈ 1/3 2/3 p 1 2 ∈ 1/3 2/3 , and p 1 3 ∈ 2/3 1 . Thus p 1 2 < p 1 3 and p 1 1 < p 1 3 . Since g · and h · are both strictly increasing and concave, 0 < h 1 ≤ h 3 0 < h 2 ≤ h 3 , g 1 ≥ g 3 > 0, and g 2 ≥ g 3 > 0.
If all three elements in that column are negative, then in particular the first one is. Since bc < 0, h 2 /p 1 2 g 3 /p 1 3 > g 2 /p 1 2 h 3 /p 1 3 and thus h 2 g 3 /h 3 g 2 > p 1 3 − /p 1 2 − > 1, contradicting that h 2 g 3 /h 3 g 2 ≤ 1. If all three elements in that column are positive, then in particular the second one is. Since c > 0, h 3 /p 1 3 < g 3 /p 1 3 and thus h 3 /g 3 < 1/p 1 3 − . Since we have imposed that q 1 h 1 /p 1 1 = q 1 g 1 /p 1 1 = 1 g 1 /h 1 = p 1 1 − and thus h 3 g 1 /g 3 h 1 < p 1 1 − /p 1 3 − < 1, where the last inequality follows from p 1 1 < p 1 3 . But this contradicts the fact that h 3 g 1 /g 3 h 1 ≥ 1. Thus Hens's example is incorrect.
Where exactly did Hens go wrong? Like us, he uses the first-order necessary conditions characterizing the two agents' asset demands to form a linear system in the probabilities of the sunspot states. Solving the system, he establishes three restrictions on some auxiliary functions that ensure that the probability of each state is strictly positive. His proof is constructive, and he attempts to show the existence of strictly concave functions that satisfy a system of inequalities. He actually relies on piecewise linear approximations to more general concave functions. Using these approximations, he describes properties of the auxiliary functions ((i)-(v) of Hens (2000)) that he says suffice for the requisite inequalities to hold. Unfortunately, his five conditions do not imply his original inequalities. In particular, condition (v) is not strong enough.
We will now construct an equilibrium where sunspots matter. The matrix for sunspotcontingent asset payoffs is We conclude by arguing that the following four conditions are necessary for MasColell's conjecture to be false in economies where spot prices differ across sunspot realizations and where agents are risk averse. First, there must be at least two agents so that there can be some ex ante asset trade. Second, there must be at least two assets for exactly the same reason. Third, there must be at least three states of nature so that markets are actually incomplete, and Cass and Shell's (1983) classic result about full insurance is not germane. Fourth, there must be at least two goods in each spot market, since otherwise no risk-averse agent would hold a strictly positive amount of any asset even if it were priced at fair odds. Economics, Southern Methodist University, Box 0496, Room 301J, Umphrey Lee Bldg., 3300 Dyer St., Dallas, TX 75275-0496, U.S.A.; rbarnett@mail.smu.edu and Dept. of Economics, The Ohio State University, 410 Arps Hall, 1945 N. High St., Columbus, OH 43210, U.S.A.; fisher.244@osu.edu; http://economics.sbs.ohio-state.edu/efisher Manuscript received July, 2000; final revision received December, 2000. REFERENCES Cass, David, and K. Shell (1983) : "Do Sunspots Matter?" Journal of Political Economy, 91, The unique no-sunspot equilibrium has p 1 s = 1, q 1 = 1, and x 1 s = 1/2 1/2 , x 2 s = 1/2 1/2 , and y 1 = y 2 = 0 0 . Because preferences are identical and homothetic, there is only one price vector that supports equilibrium for any 1 + 2 = 1 1 . Thus the equilibria are distinguished only by virtue of their allocations, not supporting prices.
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